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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 is a well-written and 
tightly argued analysis.  This Essay addresses two topics meriting more 
attention than they received from these authors.  First, this Essay 
considers in greater detail a topic the book briefly addresses—the human 
research necessary to support clinical use of genetic interventions.  What 
appears as simply a step along the way to clinical benefits may actually 
present serious impediments.  Second, this Essay expands on a point the 
authors mentioned only in passing.  They noted that developments in 
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genetics are blurring traditional species boundaries.  Blurred boundaries 
between humans and other species raise questions about our moral 
obligations in applying genetic interventions. 
II.  HUMAN STUDIES ISSUES 
The authors frequently observed that many predictions about possible 
benefits from the new molecular genetics could prove incorrect.  
Nevertheless, they took the risk of overestimating what genetic 
interventions will achieve in order to “provide guidance for significant 
choices that our society may well have to make in the future.”2  
Accordingly, they discussed justice in a world in which genetic 
interventions, including germ line interventions in human embryos, 
provide valuable benefits to members of society. 
For the most part, this Essay supports the authors’ efforts to anticipate 
the ethical implications of potential genetic knowledge and technology.  
We will need many years of analysis and debate to delineate defensible 
policies and practices for the future.  On the other hand, it seems 
important to give due regard to the ethical issues that will arise along the 
way.  Human research is one precondition to clinical performance of 
selective, rapid, and accurate direct genetic interventions in gametes or 
embryos.  The authors perhaps underestimated the scientific, ethical, and 
practical impediments to conducting such research. 
Elliott Sober’s appendix on genetic causation sheds light on the 
complexity of the research task.  Sober noted various difficulties and 
uncertainties in determining the relative contributions of genes and 
environment to human traits.  He described data from plant experiments 
showing that gene and environment interactions can be complex and that 
“genes make a difference in some contexts and not in others, and that the 
same is true of the environment.”3  Because “ethics prevents us from 
cloning human beings and rearing them in identical environments,”4 we 
must rely on quantitative genetics to estimate the relative contributions 
of genes and environment to various traits of interest.  Molecular 
techniques can provide information about which genes affect various 
traits, but again, the effect of a specific gene on a trait can be 
environmentally mediated in complex ways.  Having a gene associated 
with a condition is not sufficient to produce the condition. 
Before genetic interventions in human embryos can proceed in the 
clinical setting, research findings must show that such interventions are 
 
 2. Id.  
 3. Elliot Sober, The Meaning of Genetic Causation, in BUCHANAN ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 360 app.1. 
 4. Id. at 363. 
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safe and effective ways of producing benefits to children.  Research 
findings must also show that the interventions are equivalent to or better 
than other available interventions in producing such benefits.  If a health 
problem or other disfavored condition can be addressed more effectively 
and safely by alternative means, genetic interventions should not be 
performed.  What procedures and data will be necessary to demonstrate 
the relative safety and efficacy of genetic interventions in human embryos? 
The process of establishing safety and efficacy will be intricate.  First, 
a gene or group of genes must be determined to be a substantial cause 
(how substantial?) of the trait of interest.  Second, scientists must 
develop safe and accurate methods to test embryos for the relevant genes 
and to replace those genes with ones believed likely (how likely?) to 
produce the desired change.  Third, the children receiving the replaced 
genes must be observed over time to assess the positive and negative 
effects of the replacement.  Sober’s analysis suggested that researchers 
should observe children raised in different common environments, for 
effects could differ depending on factors such as diet, living conditions, 
climate, parental attitudes, and so forth.  Fourth, the technique must be 
compared to other possible methods of achieving the desired change. 
In this context, scientists will be studying not corn plants, but people.  
Can valid, ethical studies of this sort be conducted?  The authors of 
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice acknowledged some of 
the complexities, uncertainties, and risks presented by research on germ 
line interventions in humans.  They concluded, however, that research 
should proceed, with “careful scrutiny of any protocols for experiments 
involving these interventions.”5  It is possible, they wrote, that scientists 
will develop the means to perform precise genetic repairs, reduce germ 
line intervention risks to acceptable levels, and produce valuable 
treatment or enhancement benefits.  Because “we cannot place much 
weight on predictions that particular technical problems will be 
intractable . . . taking a long-term view of the prospects of genetic 
intervention seems a reasonable flirtation with the future.”6  The authors 
stressed the need for careful scrutiny of studies proposed and conducted 
to determine whether the potential benefits of genetic interventions 
outweigh the risks to children and those in later generations that might 
be affected.  Yet they did not explore in detail either the research 
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necessary to supply such information or the ethical considerations 
relevant to reviewing such research. 
The first phase of human research is primarily designed to 
investigate an experimental intervention’s safety.  Though animal and 
other preclinical studies can shed light on human risks, they cannot fully 
predict the human response.  The more limited the safety information 
that can be gleaned from alternatives to human studies, the greater the 
risk inherent in initial human testing.  Germ line genetic interventions in 
human embryos will be most defensible when there is strong preclinical 
evidence of safety for the human subject of the intervention, as well as 
for that subject’s offspring.  Support for human testing will also be 
strongest for interventions directed at life-threatening conditions that 
cannot be treated in any other way.7  The less serious the condition and 
the more options already available to treat it, the more difficult it will be 
to justify initial human testing. 
A related matter concerns the standard of safety that must be met 
before further research would be justified.  Daniel Koshland suggested that 
adequate safety would exist if a germ line genetic intervention were 
shown to be “no more risky than the normal process of birth and 
conception” and if the “children . . . turn[ed] out to be at least as good as 
their parents.”8  These two phrases describe different standards—one 
could be assessed at birth; the other would require long-term assessment.  
Moreover, greater detail is needed regarding how the standards could be 
put into practice. 
Observing a germ line intervention’s effect on the embryo and fetus 
can provide only limited data.9  Accordingly, the resulting children must 
be observed as well.  How many children would be an adequate sample 
for safety testing?  How long should they be followed?  Must their 
offspring be followed as well?  And what will researchers look for?  
Paul Billings noted that safety evaluators will need methods to assess 
“non-gross changes in complex system development (mental, for 
example) or the late-life results of inflammatory or degenerative 
complications arising from a genetic intervention.”10  It will be particularly 
difficult to assess the safety of interventions designed to address 
 
 7. Jeremy Sugarman, Ethical Considerations in Leaping from Bench to Bedside, 
285 SCIENCE 2071, 2071 (1999). 
 8. Daniel Koshland, Jr., Ethics and Safety, in ENGINEERING THE HUMAN 
GERMLINE 25, 26 (Gregory Stock & John Campbell eds., 2000). 
 9. See W. French Anderson, A New Front in the Battle Against Disease, in 
ENGINEERING THE HUMAN GERMLINE, supra note 8, at 43, 47 (stating that currently only 
“gross defect or death” can be assessed in a human zygote injected with an exogenous 
gene). 
 10. Paul Billings, In Utero Gene Therapy: The Case Against, 5 NATURE MED. 255, 
255 (1999). 
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polygenic traits.  Because different genes interact differently with each 
other and the environment, each new genetic intervention will need to 
undergo in-depth assessment to determine its potential negative effects. 
Will prospective parents volunteer themselves and their children for 
such studies?  It is hard to imagine that many will.  The most likely 
candidates are those whose children are at risk for the most devastating 
conditions—conditions resulting in early death or severe disability.  
From among that group, candidates for enrollment will be people who 
reject childlessness and the variety of alternative ways to have healthy 
children, including preimplantation genetic diagnosis,11 other forms of 
prenatal diagnosis, donor gametes, and adoption.12  They will also be 
people with such strong desires to avoid a particular genetic risk to their 
children that they are willing to undergo an unproven intervention 
presenting unknown risks to humans, risks likely to include premature 
death and serious disability.  They will be individuals willing to accept 
responsibilities for cooperating with long-term follow-up for their 
children—children who could resist such measures as they grow older.13 
These risks, burdens, and unknowns seem to diminish the probability 
that adequately informed people will sign up for safety testing of 
interventions to address conditions other than those highly associated 
with early death or an extremely reduced quality of life.  It is difficult to 
believe that many individuals whose children face less serious threats 
would find early phase testing an appealing choice.  Thus, human testing 
of genetic interventions to prevent common illnesses such as cancer and 
heart disease and to enhance positively-viewed traits should have a 
tough time getting off the ground. 
 
 11. In this procedure, embryos created through in vitro fertilization are tested for 
genetic mutations.  Embryos that do not have mutations are implanted in the uterus and 
the others are discarded.  See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 17 (1998). 
 12. See generally MARK S. FRANKEL & AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, HUMAN 
INHERITABLE GENETIC MODIFICATIONS: ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC, ETHICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND 
POLICY ISSUES (2000), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/dspp/sfrl/germline/main.htm 
(last visited June 23, 2002) (assessing the prospects for creating genetic change in 
humans and exploring the ethical, religious, and social implications).  One might assume 
that many candidates would be opposed to prenatal diagnosis because they believe it is 
wrong to discard embryos and terminate pregnancies.  Yet people participating in germ 
line studies will not necessarily avoid such practices.  Attempts to modify the germ line 
“will still require prenatal diagnosis with the prospect of selective abortion to prevent the 
birth of seriously impaired children.”  Id. at 14. 
 13. See Gwen Moulton, Panel Finds In Utero Gene Therapy Proposal Is 
Premature, 91 J. NAT’L. CANCER INST. 407, 408 (1999). 
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Later phase human testing presents further problems.  Here, researchers 
will be collecting data on efficacy as well as safety.  The randomized 
clinical trial (RCT) is the gold standard for determining when research 
interventions should enter the clinical arena.14  Because of the 
environmental and other nongenetic influences on most genetic 
conditions, RCTs will often be needed to evaluate whether particular 
genetic interventions are effective in reducing the undesired trait’s 
incidence.  Moreover, because observational biases could influence 
results in many cases, blinding of participants and investigators will 
often be desirable.  The standard RCT approach also would support 
comparing the group receiving the genetic intervention to a placebo 
group when there is no available alternative intervention or the available 
alternative is of questionable efficacy. 
Consider the requirements of a classic RCT in the context of 
evaluating genetic interventions in human embryos.  Prospective parents 
would be asked to enroll in a study requiring them to undergo in vitro 
fertilization and other procedures involved in embryo intervention 
without assurance that their children would receive the modification.  If 
a placebo group were included, they would have to agree to the 
possibility that no actual intervention would be performed.  Whenever 
parental expectations could influence study results, parents would have 
to agree to remain blinded for the period necessary to perform an 
adequate evaluation.  If this were a lengthy period, the group assignment 
would have to be kept from the children as well. 
Again, it is doubtful that many parents will be willing to enroll 
themselves and their children in such trials.  Only those seeking to avoid 
the most severe disorders are likely to accept the conditions and 
uncertainties of participating in classic RCTs.  Perhaps researchers will 
devise methods to evaluate genetic interventions that impose fewer 
constraints on parents and children.  But scientifically rigorous data on 
potential harms and benefits is a moral and regulatory prerequisite to 
approving genetic interventions for clinical use. 
Germ line genetic interventions present numerous research ethics 
issues that will not be easily resolved.  One set of issues concerns the 
appropriate authority of parents to bind children to future long-term 
follow-up measures.  Another concerns the reproductive freedom of 
individuals whose altered germ lines are later determined to present 
threats to future generations.  Many issues will arise in establishing 
acceptable risk-expected benefit ratios for proposals to test germ line 
interventions in humans.  A major question is whether a defensible 
 
 14. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185–
212 (2d ed. 1986). 
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approach to assessing risk to future generations can be developed. 
Other questions concern the appropriate outcome measures for germ 
line interventions.  Would the finding of interest be absence of the 
undesired genes in the child or absence of the undesired symptoms or 
characteristics?  Would the intervention’s effect be measured according 
to the child’s functional abilities, subjective well-being, success in life 
activities, or economic productivity, as compared to children in control 
groups?  As researchers move away from interventions to prevent early 
death and extreme impairment, it will become more difficult to 
formulate and measure desirable outcomes of genetic interventions. 
In sum, scientists and ethicists contemplating the potential benefits 
offered by germ line interventions should give more thought to the 
design and ethics of research on safety and efficacy in humans.  
“Leaping from bench to bedside”15 may be more problematic than has 
generally been assumed.  Will it be possible to conduct the research that 
will provide an adequate knowledge base for offering germ line 
interventions in the medical setting?  Will it be possible to enroll and 
retain a sufficient number of participants to collect the necessary data?  
Will it be possible to collect such data consistent with requirements that 
participants (including offspring once they become adults) give informed 
and voluntary consent to research procedures?  Only by addressing these 
and other research questions can we determine whether, and if so, how, 
speculative benefits from germ line genetic interventions will materialize in 
the clinical setting. 
III.  A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
In From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, the authors were 
most interested in exploring a “set of distributive justice issues raised by 
rapid advances in genetic science that have not yet even been 
systematically articulated, much less resolved.”16  Rather than addressing 
“old questions in new guises,” they confronted “the broader implications 
of the possibility of identity-altering interventions for theorizing about 
justice.”17 
The authors left out at least one broad implication of these 
interventions, however.  They observed that “[t]he basic techniques of 
 
 15. Sugarman, supra note 7, at 2071. 
 16. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 62–63. 
 17. Id. at 62. 
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manipulating DNA render the so-called barriers between species 
breachable,” making “the very idea of a species . . . less important.”18  
They discussed traditional assumptions that moral theory must be 
based on human nature, and noted that our conception of justice could 
be altered if genetic knowledge and technology give us the power to 
alter human nature.  They wrote: “[I]f we come to regard the constraints 
of our ‘nature’ as rather negligible, as our ability to change ourselves 
increases, we may then focus directly on what sorts of characteristics 
we want our lives and the lives of our offspring to have, whether they 
are human lives or not.”19  They also commented that heightened 
“[a]ppreciation for the fungibility of DNA, the consequent malleability 
of life, and the permeability of so-called species barriers . . . may add 
impetus to the efforts of animal rights activists to rid our moral 
theorizing of parochialism.”20 
The remainder of the book considers justice toward humans, arguing 
that “a just health care system should strive to remove barriers to 
opportunity that are due to disease,”21 and discusses when “genetic 
interventions may be required to counteract the opportunity-limiting 
effects of natural inequalities that do not constitute diseases.”22  The 
authors seemed to assume that any such justice-based obligations apply 
only to those traditionally labeled human.  Yet the blurring of species 
boundaries made possible through new genetic knowledge could alter 
conventional ideas about who belongs to “the primary moral community.”23 
Recent activities in genetics research emphasize the substantial natural 
genetic similarities among mammalian and even nonmammalian species.  
Roundworm, fruit fly, and mouse genomes are being sequenced in part 
because this will provide information on biologic processes occurring in 
humans.  Current technology enables researchers to transfer human genes to 
other species, creating transgenic animals.  Thus far, such transfers have 
been limited to small amounts of genetic material, keeping traditional 
species labels intact.  Yet transfers of more extensive amounts of genetic 
material may become feasible.  It also may become possible to enhance 
the cognitive abilities of other species through genetic interventions.24 
Imagine that scientists locate a group of human genes strongly 
associated with memory.  They transfer those genes to chimpanzee and 
 
 18. Id. at 87. 
 19. Id. at 93. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 16. 
 22. Id. at 96. 
 23. Id. at 258. 
 24. See Nicholas Wade, Smarter Mouse Is Created in Hope of Helping People, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A1. 
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gorilla embryos, and find the animals’ memory and general intelligence 
are significantly enhanced.  What moral issues would be raised by this 
research? 
First, note that this alteration would only increase the substantial 
natural DNA similarities between humans and the great apes.  It would 
also only improve the relatively high cognitive capacities that chimpanzees 
and gorillas possess naturally.  The great apes’ natural abilities underlie 
current efforts to grant them heightened moral and legal protection.25  
The transgenic creatures would simply resemble humans even more in 
their genetic and behavioral characteristics. 
The ability to create enhanced great apes would present numerous 
ethical and policy questions.  I focus on a few that are relevant to the 
analysis in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice.  The authors 
addressed justice in distributing genetic interventions to cure or prevent 
disease, which is defined as “adverse departures from normal species 
functioning.”26  If genetic interventions render species boundaries less 
important and more permeable, what happens to this definition of 
disease?  What is normal species functioning for the transgenic creatures 
described above?  How would a theory of the morality of inclusion apply 
to the transgenic primates?  At what point would they be close enough to 
humans to be granted equal moral respect and to possess the same 
justice-based claims to special interventions and resources possessed by 
people with disabilities?  It seems to me that the From Chance to 
Choice: Genetics and Justice authors need to address these implications 
of blurred species boundaries “to rid [their own] moral theorizing of 
parochialism.” 27 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Before we reach questions of distributive justice and reproductive 
autonomy in the use of germ line alterations in human embryos, we will 
face questions of how to conduct scientifically valid, ethical research on 
these interventions.  Gene transfers between humans and other species 
could make it more difficult to defend traditional stark distinctions 
between moral obligations owed to humans and to other animals and could 
 
 25. Allan Coukell, New Zealanders Press Plan for Apes’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 1999, at F3. 
 26. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. 
 27. Id. at 93. 
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complicate the task of achieving justice in the use of genetic knowledge and 
interventions.  Inquiries into the ethics of genetic intervention should add 
clinical research and blurred species boundaries to the list of topics that 
merit careful ethical analysis. 
 
 
 
